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Abstract
Open science is not a particularly novel idea: disclosing science to expose
it to a public scrutiny is among the deeds of the modern science revolution.
Neither is new the unbalance between science - the living craftsmanship of
a knowledge community - and its alleged embodiment in textual objects: the
scope of written papers is so wide in space and time that they can be adopted
as knowledge proxies. Such a question, in fact, is as ancient as Plato’s critique
of writing in Phaedrus. Accordingly, open science can be understood in two
different - and not necessarily congruent - meanings: (1) as a philosophical
ideal of human emancipation through the opening of scholarly conversation
among people; (2) as a management model that might also be aimed to the
exploitation of open research texts and data for the sake of the market.
Since the Italian research evaluation system is based on an administrative
agency that is in control of all the facets of academic life, it would not be -
administratively - difficult to add an open science mandate to the researchers’
burden of duties. Philosophically, however, we have to ask not only why open
science, today, needs to be mandated, but, above all, whether (open) science
can be mandated.
1
The application of a Kantian thought experiment to a vindication of the Ital-
ian State assessment of research attempted by one of its former functionaries
helps us to show that:
1. open science needs to be mandated because it is not open any longer;
2. the very submission of research to blueprints dictated by an administra-
tive authority reduces it to a bureaucratic, commodified enterprise whose
horizon is not the advancement of learning - or discoveries and revolu-
tions yet to do - but the production of information and data whose goal
is not determined by the will to knowledge any longer, but by economic
and political powers.
1 Open science: a modern revolution
However novel it may seem, Open Science is a revolution, whose practices are
so extraordinary that they need to be mandated by funding and research orga-
nizations, only in an astronomical meaning. The idea that science, to be science
instead of magic, should be made public is as old as Modern Science itself. Galileo
Galilei did not need a mandate to have his Sidereus Nuncius put into print by a
small publisher in Venice. And although one of Galilei’s purposes was gaining the
patronage of Cosimo de’ Medici, he was eager to share his discoveries with the
public as well, so that everyone might see and recognize their truth:
Parmi necessario, per aumentare il grido di questi scoprimenti, il fare che
con l’effetto stesso sia veduta et riconosciuta la verità da più persone che sia
possibile.1
Publicity is one of the basic features of modern science: research cannot be
secret any longer, because it needs the community of scientists to “provide for
the social validation of scientific work”. 2 “Dissimulating, refraining from making
one’s opinions public, only means cheating and deceiving. . . . Secrecy, according
to science and within it, has become a negative value.”3
While depicting the similarities between printing and digital revolution, Clay
Shirky remarked that the major difference between alchemists and the Early Mod-
ern chemists gathered in the Invisible College, precursor of the Royal Society,4
was that the latter, unlike the former, shared their experiments and results,5 by
"describing and disputing their methods and conclusions so that they all might
benefit from both successes and failures, and build on each other’s work“.6 Within
1Galileo Galilei. Lettera a Belisario Vinta. Pisa, 1610. url: https://www.fondazionesancarlo.
it/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Bucciantini.pdf#page=30.
2Robert K. Merton. Behavior Patterns of Scientists. 1968. url: http://www.dcscience.net/
merton - behavior - patterns - of - scientists - 1968 . pdf in Robert K. Merton. The Sociology of
Science. Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Ed. by Norman W. Storer. Chicago and London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1973. url: https://archive.org/details/robert_K_merton_the_
sociology_of_science, p. 339
3Paolo Rossi. La nascita della scienza moderna in Europa. Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2015, p. II.5.
4It is worth remembering that one of the earliest modern scientific academies was - although with
some limitations - the Italian Accademia dei Lincei (ibid., p. XVI.3).
5"To see this in fitting historical context, we must remember that the first scientific journals confronted
not an excess but a deficiency of manuscripts meriting publication“(Merton, Behavior Patterns of
Scientists, p. 216): since research used to be secret, publishing was hardly an ordinary choice.
6Clay Shirky. “The Shock of Inclusion”. In: Edge (2010). url: https://www.edge.org/response-
detail/11609.
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such a cultural revolution, the printing press was not the determining cause: it
was just a means, which needed to be put under control and into use at the service
of the new community of science.
Accordingly, the earliest scientific journal, the Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society was originally meant as a ”social registry of scientific inno-
vation“,7 whose goal was not to deliver ”research products“, but to make theories
and discoveries public in a socially controlled way, so that they could be properly
attributed and civilly debated. It was, in other words, a way for coming to terms
with the printing revolution and its new, enlarged publicity. Even the peer re-
view process was not anonymous:8 papers were formally presented, perused and
reported by a couple of Royal Society fellows and publicly debated. Since the
discoveries were noted in a confidential register, the printed journal was initially
meant just as a way to present a selection of them to the public.9
The point of the Royal Society’s reading regime was never to eliminate dis-
putes like those through which Newton prospered. On the contrary, it was
meant to generate them. The intent was to produce fertile engagements be-
tween people who thought differently and who might otherwise have had no
common ground on which to meet. The Society’s civility served first to bring
this about, and then to limit and manage the resulting disagreements.10
Was modern science open? According to the economist Paul A. David, it cer-
tainly was, but in the abridged version of a club good: since scientific research
depended on patronage, opening it within academies, like the Royal Society, and
their journals helped prospective patrons - aristocrats and kings - in selecting the
best reputed scientists. Being accepted among the members of an academy and
publishing in its journals were ways to enhance one’s own status by means of a
kind of ”signaling value“ and to gain the opportunity of participating in networks
of expert ”peers“:11 Such informational advantages, however, came at a price:
journals and academies entailed a degree of closeness, or, otherwise stated, of
conservatism:
To be generous, one might conclude that what had been attained was a second-
best (or maybe third-best) social outcome – gaining for “the insiders” the
efficiencies of exchanging scientific information as a club good, but losing the
possibilities of greater positive externalities from more closely approaching a
scientifically meritocratic, universally open regime of cooperation in the pursuit
of knowledge.12
7Jean-Claude Guédon. In Oldenburg’s Long Shadow. Librarians, Research Scientists, Publishers,
and the Control of Scientific Publishing. Washington D.C.: Association of Research Libraries, 2001.
url: https://www.arl.org/wp-content/uploads/2001/12/in-oldenburgs-long-shadow.pdf, 5 ff.
8”The first referee systems that we would recognize as such were set in place by English scientific
societies in the early nineteenth century“(Alexis Csiszar. “Peer review: troubled from the start”. In:
Nature (Apr. 19, 2016). url: https://www.nature.com/news/peer-%20review-%20troubled-%20from-
%20the-%20start-%201.19763).
9Adrian Johns. Piracy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009, p. 61.
10ibid., p. 69, emphasis mine.
11Paul A. David. The historical origins of ’open science’. 2007. url: https : / / pdfs .
semanticscholar.org/2948/0da8855b61022f0e0a9fb5808444f428af08.pdf, 57 ff.
12Ibid., p. 68.
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2 Allotrioi typoi
At the end of the Enlightenment age, Immanuel Kant knew that scientific debate
should be much more than seeking a status for the sake of its signaling value or
of the opportunity to interact with a network of peers. Making a public use of
reason - speaking "as scholars before the entire public of the world of readers"13 -
is not just about science, universities and academies, but about everyone’s human
emancipation. In fact, "when the public use of reason is free, a few of free thinkers
can inspire everybody to rationally appraise their own value and to become aware
of their call to think for themselves".14 In Kant’s opinion, scholars cannot conceive
themselves as functionaries of particular collective organizations: they should
consider themselves as member of the cosmopolitan society - the society of the
citizens of the world. Against such a horizon, it becomes easier to grasp the
narrowness and the unavoidable bias of any particular club, or, put in David’s
terms, why science as club good cannot be more than a second best.
The very printing press that made it possible to address a larger public shaped
the way in which science was communicated and shared. Technological revolutions
”enable the society to articulate entirely new forms of social action, but at the same
time they irreversibly disable formerly available modes of social behavior“.15 The
purpose of the Royal Society reading regime was to generate open and public
debates among scholars: yet, its goal was attained by paying an inevitable toll to
printing, a media technology that intensified and gave industrial-scale power to a
set of unbalances that Plato had already seen at work in the invention of writing.
For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who
learn to use it, because they will not practice their memory. Their trust in
writing, produced by external characters (allotrioi typoi) which are no part
of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them. You
have invented an elixir not of memory, but of reminding; and you offer your
pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom, for they will read many
things without instruction and will therefore seem to know many things, when
they are for the most part ignorant and hard to get along with, since they are
not wise, but only appear wise.16
Writing is a powerful tool, because it unlooses the transmission of information
from word of mouth. Still, hearsay made possible a real-time ”cognitive barter“
and an interactive conversation that - as Plato knew - may create new knowledge
as well. Writing, on the other hand, leaves a lasting record, but at a price: freezing
the synchronous stream of oral conversations and slowing down the interactivity
of our thought and learning processes.17 Moreover, its physical durability - its
potentiality to travel across time and space - may generate a kind of knowledge
delusion: owning a lot of books and even having read a great deal of them may
13Immanuel Kant. Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? 1784. url: http://korpora.org/
Kant/aa08/033.html, Ak. VIII 37.
14Ibid., Ak. VIII 36.
15Joseph Weizenbaum. Computer power and human reason. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and
Company, 1976, p. 38.
16Plato. Phaedrus. url: http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.
tlg012.perseus-grc1:227a, 275a-b.
17Stevan Harnad. “Back to the Oral Tradition Through Skywriting at the Speed of Thought (Ranimer
la tradition orale par la ciélographie à la vélocité de l’esprit)”. In: Les défis de la publication sur le
Web: Hyperlectures, cybertextes et méta-editions. 2003. url: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.
fr/sic_00000315/.
4
certainly convey us much information, but how can we be sure to know all that we
believe to know if we do not check it by explaining, demonstrating, arguing and
even being persuaded to change our minds by interacting with others?
How to take advantage of the power of writing without forgetting that knowl-
edge is made of people and conversations? Plato’s solution was based on two
principles :18
• freedom of texts
• promotion of knowledge communities
Texts, it is true, provide reminders against forgetfulness19. They should, there-
fore, be used, but without taking them too seriously, because they are nothing
without people. It is much more important ”writing in the mind of the learner:“20
after all, in a manuscript culture, documents cannot survive and last without people
copying, reading, studying and commenting them. We have to embrace the ”alien
shapes“ (allotrioi typoi) of writing to revive them as thoughts and ideas, because
letters, without us, are dead.21
3 A question of trust: proxies - resistible and irre-
sistible
According to Moses Finley, we might say that all ancient writings were similar
to samizdat , because they circulated as manuscripts, written and disseminated
by hand.22 The very slowness of copying made the balance between persons and
texts easier to attain: the craft of amanuensis could not overload the diverse
scholarships, arts and crafts of knowledge communities with writings exceeding the
amount of what the latter were interested in reading and, therefore, in preserving
by having them copied. The printing revolution, however, gave writings the strength
of an industrial production and, as we have seen, compelled scholars to build a
new balance system, made of community-controlled scientific journals. In a long
term perspective, even the current ICT revolution is simply a further step in such a
growing unbalance between people and their knowledge communities, on the one
hand, and media technology, on the other hand.23 Today, when Jaron Lanier regrets
that "communication is now often experienced as a superhuman phenomenon that
towers above individuals. A new generation has come of age with a reduced
expectation of what a person can be, and of who each person might become”,24,
18A more detailed account on Plato’s Phaedrus media theory can be seen in Maria Chiara Pievatolo.
«Friends have all things in common»: intellectual property, publishing, and politics. 2006. url: http:
//doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.51532.
19Plato, op. cit., 275d.
20Ibid., 276a.
21In Plato’s Phaedrus Socrates does not discuss with a communication expert, like Phaedrus, to
establish whether or not the soul exists but to understand the relationship between communication
technologies and the cultural environment they contribute to create (Maria Chiara Pievatolo. “Jaron
Lanier, You are not a Gadget”. In: Bollettino telematico di filosofia politica [2012]. url: https:
//btfp.sp.unipi.it/it/2012/10/jaron-lanier-you-are-not-a-gadget/).
22Moses Finley. La democrazia antichi e dei moderni. Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1982, p. 46.
23Unsurprisingly, even the fear of information overload is as ancient as book writing (David Wein-
berger. Too Big to Know. New York: Basic Books, 2011. url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Too_
Big_to_Know, p. I.2).
24Jaron Lanier. You are not a Gadget. New York: A.A. Knopf, 2010. url: http://btfp.sp.unipi.
it/?p=2842, ch. I.
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he is just dealing with the last chapter of an alienation process that started,
some millennia ago, with the writing revolution: through the ages, more and more
powerful media have being constantly increasing our potential dependence on the
inherent knowledge illusion of their allotrioi typoi.
The printing process had its peculiar technological and economic bottleneck:
since it was not possible to print everything, the manuscripts had be selected for
publishing, through the expertise of commercial and scientific gatekeepers working
as peer reviewers.ff16 For this reason, being published by a peer-reviewed scientific
journal could be treated as a kind of scientific branding,25 and receiving many
citations within a selected set of scientific journals could be sold as a way to
measure quality through impact. In other words, this very bottleneck made it
possible, as of the second half of the previous century, to use journals and citations
as proxies for scientific value. Mario Biagioli describes the outsourcing of research
evaluation to bibliometric proxies as a double alienation.
Unlike traditional practices of evaluation that, like peer review, are not just
qualitative but craft-based, metrics cannot be produced by a single scholar but
are instead obtained, typically for a fee, from large data analytics corpora-
tions - yet another example of today’s monetization of data. The introduction
of quantitative and automated methodologies has thus introduced a new sep-
aration between the producer and the user of the evidence on which the eval-
uation rests - two roles that were traditionally folded into the same person:
the scholar who read and judged. Metrics are therefore a “doubly alien” form
of knowledge: both produced and used by people who are not practitioners of
the field to which the publications belong.26
Against a long term historical horizon, such an alienation is just the last chapter
of a long process of technological emancipation of the means - the media - from
the knowledge contents and the debates they convey and on which they are based.
Its steps can be summarized as follows:
• writing, with its allotrioi typoi, makes it possible to separate documents from
people;
• printing, while industrializing the production of documents, adopts a selec-
tion method based on the choices of small groups of people that can be used
as an evaluation proxy:
• ICT adds the power to transform those choices into data and to compute
them.
The outcome of such a growing unbalance between knowledge communities
and media is already entailed in Plato’s ancient comment: it is the systemic
delusion of “knowing many things, while being for the most part ignorant”. And
yet, this sequence is not enough to prove a doom of technological determinism:
indeed, for many centuries after the printing revolution, scientific communities
succeeded in keeping media under their control. For instance, during the 19th
century great Devonian controversy, "the role of formal published papers in relation
16Guedon2001
25Guédon, op. cit., 16 ff.
26Mario Biagioli. “Quality to Impact, Text to Metadata: Publication and Evaluation in the Age
of Metrics”. In: KNOW: A Journal on the Formation of Knowledge 2.2 (2018), pp. 249–275. url:
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/699152, p. 252.
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to informal argument during the controversy could aptly be compared with the role
of occasional - and generally unrevealing - press releases during the real hard
work of diplomatic negotiations behind closed doors.”27 And when Charles Darwin’s
fellow scientists had to prevent a potential controversy with Alfred Russel Wallace
on the priority of the former’s or the latter’s evolutionary theory it did not occur
to them to invoke the authority of a journal. They just arranged a public reading
of extracts from Darwin’s manuscripts between 1844 and 1857 and of Wallace’s
draft essay before the Linnean Society of London.28
For journals, citations and metrics to become irresistible as research evaluation
proxies, a further condition is required: a weakened and politically disqualified
community of knowledge - whose inner ”philosophical transactions“ are not con-
sidered trustworthy, or are not considered trustworthy any longer.
The appeal of numbers is especially compelling to bureaucratic officials
who lack the mandate of a popular election, or divine right. Arbitrariness and
bias are the most usual grounds upon which such officials are criticized. A
decision made by the numbers (or by explicit rules of some other sort) has at
least the appearance of being fair and impersonal. Scientific objectivity thus
provides an answer to a moral demand for impartiality and fairness. Quan-
tification is a way of making decisions without seeming to decide. Objectivity
lends authority to officials who have very little of their own.29
Even when the current, bureaucratic university managements governing alien-
ated researchers call on the principles of academic freedom of the 19th century
higher education model as defined by Wilhelm von Humboldt, they cannot actu-
ally follow them any longer. Humboldt was aware that research skills and crafts
cannot be represented by proxies, but had to be assessed - or peer-reviewed - by
knowledge communities. Hence, he tried to institutionalize and protect scholarly
autonomy for reasons rather similar to those justifying judicial independence.30
It is a peculiarity of the higher scientific institutions that they always treat
science as a problem that has still not been fully resolved and therefore remain
constantly engaged in research, whereas the school deals with and teaches
only finished and agreed-upon bits of knowledge.31
In Humboldt’s perspective, science, in the widest meaning of the word, was not
about information - or discoveries done: it was about advancement of learning -
27Martin J. S Rudwick. The Great Devonian Controversy: The Shaping of Scientific Knowledge
among Gentlemanly Specialists. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. url: http://www.math.
chalmers.se/~ulfp/Review/devon.pdf, p. 448.
28Reporting this event (Robert K. Merton. Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the
Sociology of Science. 1957. url: http://joelvelasco.net/teaching/3330/Merton%20Priorities%
20in%20Science%201957.pdf, p. 651) R.K Merton commented that "personal honesty is supported by
the public and testable character of science“. And it is remarkable that, in 1858, the publicity of science
still took on the appearance of a public conference.
29Theodore M. Porter. Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life.
Princeton U.P.. Princeton, 1995. url: http://www.andreasaltelli.eu/file/repository/Excerpts.
pdf, p. 8, emphasis added.
30Paolo Prodi. Università e città nella storia europea. Il Mulino. Bologna, 2013. url: http:
//btfp.sp.unipi.it/dida/humboldt/#idp156368, § IV
31Wilhelm von Humboldt. “Über die innere und äussere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen
Anstalten in Berlin”. In: ed. by Christoph Markschies. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Humboldt-
Universität, Leitung und Verwaltung, 2010, pp. 229–241. doi: 10.18452/4653, p. 230; transl. at
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3642&language=english
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or discoveries yet to do. It is - as Richard Feynman would have said later - ”the
belief in the ignorance of experts”:32 hence, it cannot be submitted to unbending
accountability rules and quantitative evaluation criteria without sacrificing the
knowledge yet to come on the altar of the established one. Accordingly, his public
higher learning model - only a part of a comprehensive reform that was never
fulfilled - was inspired by three principles:
• solitariness (independence from corporate and political powers)
• freedom (self-determination of research interests and topics)
• cooperation (commitment to a common goal, within a common space of ex-
perience and debate)33
Although it was carried out in a partial and classist way only,34 the Humbold-
tian model was based on a project of human emancipation.35 And it is noteworthy
that the ”Humboldt myth“ arose at the beginning of the 20th century, when the
government self-restraint was coming to an end and universities were beginning
to metamorphose in state-owned capitalistic enterprises, as Max Weber had pre-
cociously understood:
Of late we can observe distinctly that the German universities in the broad
fields of science develop in the direction of the American system. The large in-
stitutes of medicine or natural science are ’state capitalist’ enterprises, which
cannot be managed without very considerable funds. Here we encounter the
same condition that is found wherever capitalist enterprise comes into opera-
tion: the ’separation of the worker from his means of production.’ The worker,
that is, the assistant, is dependent upon the implements that the state puts
at his disposal; hence he is just as dependent upon the head of the institute
as is the employee in a factory upon the management. For, subjectively and
in good faith, the director believes that this institute is ’his,’ and he manages
its affairs. Thus the assistant’s position is often as precarious as is that of
any ’quasi-proletarian’ existence and just as precarious as the position of the
assistant in the American university.36
"The exercise of free mind space requires trust”37: but how is it possible to
achieve it in a competitive, corporate-like research system populated with quasi-
proletarian researchers the meaning of whose work does not depend on them,
32Richard Feynman. What is Science? 1966. url: http://www.feynman.com/science/what-is-
science.
33Humboldt, op. cit., pp. 229–230.
34Fritz K. Ringer. The Decline of German Mandarins. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1969.
35R.D. Anderson wittily remarks that “the Prussian aristocrat also became an unlikely hero of the
German Democratic Republic. . . . Humboldt was given a positive place in official Marxist historiogra-
phy, as the East German regime sought to present itself as the heir of the nationalist and progressive
forces of the reform era. The bourgeoisie had then been the carrier of those forces, and Humboldt’s
concept of humanism had been a universal value with the potential to emancipate the whole people.
Necessarily limited in its application in absolutist and bourgeois conditions, the ideal was fulfilled
under socialism.“ (R.D. Anderson. European Universities from the Enlightenment to 1914. Oxford
Scholarship Online, 2010. url: https : / / www . oxfordscholarship . com / view / 10 . 1093 / acprof :
oso/9780198206606.001.0001/acprof-9780198206606-chapter-4)
36Max Weber. Science as a Vocation. 1919. url: http://www.anthropos- lab.net/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Science-as-a-Vocation.pdf, p. 2, emphasis added.
37Charles R. Neeson. A Declaration of the Mission of University in Barlowspace. 2019. url:
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1350&context=dltr.
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not even collectively? That is the reason why open science, today, needs to be
mandated : because any evaluation standard, within such a system, is basically
mandated. The earliest scientific journal was founded to build a system of trust
among scientists and scholars as “peers”, not upon them. However, the current
“big science” or “industrialized science’ can no longer rely on small communi-
ties whose main strength was the trust flowing from personal acquaintances and
common practices of debate.38 Therefore, its corporate-like management resorts to
proxies - core journals and bibliometric indices - to rule over a growing mass of
proletarianized researchers they can neither trust nor understand.39
4 Open science: philosophical ideal or research man-
agement model?
In a research system ruled by academic capitalism, why mandating Open Science?
The concerns of Open Access early advocates were not mainly economical, but
cultural, political, philosophical, as witnessed by the first paragraph of the original
BOAI Declaration:
An old tradition and a new technology have converged to make possible
an unprecedented public good.The old tradition is the willingness of scientists
and scholars to publish the fruits of their research in scholarly journals without
payment, for the sake of inquiry and knowledge. The new technology is the
internet. The public good they make possible is the world-wide electronic
distribution of the peer-reviewed journal literature and completely free and
unrestricted access to it by all scientists, scholars, teachers, students, and
other curious minds. Removing access barriers to this literature will accelerate
research, enrich education, share the learning of the rich with the poor and
the poor with the rich, make this literature as useful as it can be, and lay
the foundation for uniting humanity in a common intellectual conversation and
quest for knowledge.40
According to them, Open Access was meant as a way to transform science -
a club good - in a wider public good, through open electronic archives and new
scholarly-driven open access journals. In their program, economics was a means
and not an end, because they believed that an open Internet, properly used, had the
potential of doing away with the technical and economical bottlenecks of printing
38Jerome R. Ravetz. “How Should We Treat Science’s Growing Pains?” In: the Guardian (2016).
url: http://www.theguardian.com/science/political- science/2016/jun/08/how- should- we-
treat-sciences-growing-pains.
39The very quest of an“objectivity” disconnected from any disciplinary knowledge claim is facilitating
the gaming of the system: see for instance Mario Biagioli. “Watch out for cheats in citation game”.
In: Nature (2016). url: http://www.nature.com/news/watch-out-for-cheats-in-citation-game-
1.20246, Michael Fire and Carlos Guestrin. “Over-Optimization of Academic Publishing Metrics:
Observing Goodhart’s Law in Action”. en. In: GigaScience 8.6 (2019). doi: 10.1093/gigascience/
giz053 and, as regards Italy, Alberto Baccini, Giuseppe De Nicolao, and Eugenio Petrovich. “Citation
Gaming Induced by Bibliometric Evaluation: A Country-Level Comparative Analysis”. en. In: PLOS
ONE 14.9 (2019). issn: 1932-6203. doi: 10 . 1371 / journal . pone . 0221212. Another instance
of R.K. Merton’s essential paradox of the social action? (Robert K. Merton. “The Puritan Spur to
Science”. In: The Sociology of Science. Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Ed. by Norman
W. Storer. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973, pp. 228–253. url: https:
//archive.org/details/robert_K_merton_the_sociology_of_science, pp. 245–246)
40Budapest Open Access Initiative. 2002. url: https://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org/
read, emphasis added.
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by lowering the dissemination costs and by emancipating authors from the practice
of transferring their copyright to publishers. 41
In a world populated with Humboldtian universities, autonomous knowledge
communities and unalienated scholars, the ICT revolution would have provided
the tools42 to enhance the implementation of an ideal - the freedom of reason in
its public use - already practiced and shared. On the other hand, in a corporate
university,43 whose managers need to use proxies to assess researchers whom they
cannot understand and do not trust, open science as a means of human emanci-
pation is doomed to remain a rhetorically lofty but factually marginalized ideal.
Unsurprisingly, the Open Access movement did not even succeed in solving the
so-called serials crisis: if the metrics and journals that analytic services providers
and commercial publishers are selling44 maintain their proxy function, oligopolies
will hold and even strengthen their dominant positions as well.45
That is why, again, Open Science, in Europe, needs to be mandated: because
neither researchers nor administrators are able to grasp and to apply its princi-
ples any longer, since they have built or have accepted to yield to a system of
irresistible proxies based on a technologically old-fashioned association of science
communication and research evaluation.46 And that is also why also a mandated
open access might not be enough to solve the serial crisis:47 if proxies’ author-
ity remains unscathed, the journals overpricing might just shift from subscription
prices to publication fees.48
However, the current condition of scientific publishing seems to offer a glim-
mer of hope. On the readers’ side, bypassing publishers’ paywalls has become
easier, because of the blossoming of gray and black market servers49 like preprint
repositories50 and Sci-Hub. They gave universities and library consortia a stronger
41“Open Science critiques the status quo of knowledge production by asserting the importance of
democratizing knowledge, by reassessing the power relations in our knowledge infrastructure, and by
arguing that scientific knowledge needs to be managed in collaboration with those who help generate
it and will benefit from it” (Tony Horava, Preface to Leslie Chan et al., eds. Contextualizing Openness:
Situating Open Science. University of Ottawa Press IDRC - International Development Research
Centre, 2019
42See, again, Harnad, op. cit. but also ‘Pierre Lévy. “L’universel sans totalité, essence de la cy-
berculture”. In: (1997). url: http : / / www . ub . edu / prometheus21 / articulos / obsciberprome /
pierreluniversel.pdf.
43John Holmwood. “Markets versus Dialogue: The debate over open access ignores compet-
ing philosophies of openness.” In: LSE Impact Blog (2013). url: https : / / blogs . lse . ac . uk /
impactofsocialsciences/2013/10/21/markets-versus-dialogue/.
44See for instance, in addition to Guédon, op. cit., Stephen Buranyi. “Is the Staggeringly Profitable
Business of Scientific Publishing Bad for Science?” In: the Guardian (2017). url: http://www.
theguardian.com/science/2017/jun/27/profitable-business-scientific-publishing-bad-for-
science.
45Vincent Larivière, Stefanie Haustein, and Philippe Mongeon. “The Oligopoly of Academic Pub-
lishers in the Digital Era”. In: PLOS ONE 10 (2015). doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0127502.
46Jean-Claude Guédon. Open access - toward the internet of the mind. 2017. url: https://www.
budapestopenaccessinitiative.org/boai15/Untitleddocument.docx, p. 36.
47Stephen Pinfield and Johnson. Rob. Adoption of Open Access Is Rising – but so Too Are Its Costs.
en-US. 2018. url: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2018/01/22/adoption-of-
open-access-is-rising-but-so-too-are-its-costs/.
48See Jan Velterop. On the dangers of SciHub and hybrid journals. 2016. url: https://blog.
scielo.org/en/2016/03/22/on-the-dangers-of-scihub-and-hybrid-journals/.
49Jeffrey MacKie-Mason. Why force the OA transition now? An economist’s view. 2018. url:
https://oa2020.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/B14-04-Jeffrey-MacKie-Mason.pdf.
50Pablo Markin. “Preprint Repositories Gain in Institutional Legitimacy and Recognition, Reduce
the Attractiveness of Subscription Journals”. In: (2018). url: https://is.gd/oz6LVo.
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negotiating position51 and the opportunity to launch collective initiatives like Plan
S, pushing towards a full and immediate Open Access to scientific publications. At
the same time, on the publishers’ side, a very recent SPARC landscape analysis
has captured a worrying collateral effect of the ongoing transition of academic
publishing " from a content-provision to a data analytic business“:
This is evidenced by a change in the product mix that they are selling across
higher education institutions, which is expanding beyond journals and text-
books to include research assessment systems, productivity tools, online learn-
ing management systems – complex infrastructure that is critical to conducting
the end-to-end business of the university.
Through the seamless provision of these services, these companies can
invisibly and strategically influence, and perhaps exert control, over key uni-
versity decisions – ranging from student assessment to research integrity to
financial planning.52
If combined with strong Open Access mandates, such a trend might help us to
attain an open publishing ecosystem, but within a landscape of data and platform
capitalism. Although not necessarily less expensive,53 openness would be compul-
sory for researchers, but its purpose would not be an human enlightenment with
some market benefits, but the reduction of knowledge to commodity, "a gigantic
open data reservoir which those who enjoy access to the appropriate technologies
can draw from at will in pursuit of their own material interest”.54 Open science
may certainly yield some profitable discoveries and inventions as well: but inter-
preting and justifying it as a commodity for the sake of private entrepreneurial
profit and state bureaucracy efficiency would sacrifice the many to the few in at
least two senses:
1. Public funds would be devolved to private profits: under a commodified55
open science system papers and data, however open, are meant just as raw
matter or, at most, semi-finished products for the production of proprietary,
for-profit, goods and services, within a legal horizon made of pervasive copy-
right and patent rules.
2. Research would not regain its autonomy and responsibility,56 because its
final meaning would remain post-academic: proprietary, local, authoritarian
51Italy, however, did not seize such a favorable opportunity and signed a questionable agreement
with Elsevier. See the AISA statement about it: Hybrid Open Access: why paying twice? (2018).
52SPARC. Landscape Analysis The Changing Academic Publishing Industry – Implications for Aca-
demic Institutions. 2019. url: https : / / sparcopen . org / our - work / landscape - analysis/, p. 5,
emphasis mine.
53Jon Tennant. “‘Transformative’ Open Access Publishing Deals Are Only Entrenching Commercial
Power ”. In: Times Higher Education (THE) (2019).
54Michael Hagner. “Open Access, Data Capitalism and Academic Publishing”. In: Swiss Medical
Weekly 148.14600 (2018). doi: 10.4414/smw.2018.14600.
55“Commodification” of science is “any process in which scientific activities and their results are
predominantly interpreted and assessed on the basis of economic criteria” (Hans Radder, Alfred Nord-
mann, and Gregor Schiemann, eds. Science Transformed? Debating Claims of an Epochal Break.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011, p. 86) and Hans Radder. “The Commodification of
Academic Research. Science and the modern university.” In: (2010)).
56It is not just about principles: conflicts of interest in privately influenced research have conse-
quences. See for instance Ian Leslie. “The Sugar Conspiracy | Ian Leslie”. en-GB. in: The Guardian
(2016).
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- even its openness is mandated -, commissioned, expert.57
According to the Humboldtian model, science had to be open because it was
defined by its inclination to go beyond the established. Its openness mirrored the
openness of the Humboldtian purpose of education, Bildung, conceived as an "ac-
tive process of appropriating the world“ by developing the inner freedom of persons
whose sense cannot be wholly determined by society and the market.58 In open
science as research management model, on the contrary, ”open“ means just “open
for business”. Alienated researchers, already accustomed to “publish or perish”
and bibliometric assessments, would bow also to an “open or perish” bureaucratic
imperative, because they have already perished - or perhaps never lived - as au-
tonomous, critical minds. Taking inspiration from Kathleen Fitzpatrick,59 we might
represent them as undead: their mandated behavior may imitate Humboldtian or
Mertonian mores, but just as empty pretenses whose meaning lies elsewhere, in
corporate “end users” whose concern in openness is, at most, instrumental and
contingent, for the sake of private profit.60
5 Two steps backwards: Italy and the research eval-
uation knot
Whatever the meaning of open science might be, the Italian universities made a
precocious verbal commitment to it. In 2004, a very large majority of Italian uni-
versity rectors signed a Messina Declaration, supporting the Berlin Declaration
on Open Access (2003).61 However, between 2008 and 2010 Berlusconi’s gov-
ernment severely cut the higher education budget62 and promoted a centralizing
university reform63 that made administratively difficult any distributed transition
to open science. But the project to submit the Italian research to a centralized
administrative control was hardly a figment of Berlusconi’s mind: already in 2006,
under Romano Prodi’s second term as Prime Minister, a decree with the force of
law had established the National Agency for the Evaluation of the University and
57John Ziman. Real Science: What It Is and What It Means. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000, p. 78.
58Franz-Michael Konrad. “Wilhelm von Humboldt’s contribution to a theory of Bildung”. In: Theories
of Bildung and Growth: Connections and Controversies Between Continental Educational Thinking and
American Pragmatism. Ed. by Pauli Siljander, Ari Kivelä, and Ari Sutinen. Rotterdam, Boston, Taipei:
SensePublishers, 2012, p. 123.
59Kathleen Fitzpatrick. Planned Obsolescence. Publishing, Technology and the Future of Academia.
New York: New York University Press, 2011. url: http : / / mcpress . media - commons . org /
plannedobsolescence/.
60On the other hand, "publicly funded scientists, regardless of whether they pursue research on
the scale of nanometres or light years, have a moral obligation to address public needs, provide
public goods, and to disseminate, not protect, knowledge stemming from their work“(Philip Moriarty.
“Reclaiming Academia from Post-Academia”. en. In: Nature Nanotechnology 3.2 (2008), pp. 60–62.
issn: 1748-3387, 1748-3395. doi: 10.1038/nnano.2008.11. url: http://eprints.nottingham.ac.
uk/905/1/Reclaiming_Academia_from_Post-Academia_pre-print.pdf, emphasis added.
61Redazione JLIS.it. “Italian Declaration supporting the Berlin Declaration on Open Access to
Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities (2004)”. In: JLIS.it 3.2 (2012). issn: 2038-1026. doi:
10.4403/jlis.it-8630. url: https://www.jlis.it/article/view/8630.
62European Universities Association. “Europe’s responses to economic crisis”. In: University World
News (2009). url: https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20090220085540843.
63Lee Adendorff. “Italy: University reform bill passes amid protests”. In: University World News
(2010). url: https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20101202200420174.
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Research Systems (ANVUR). Later, in 2013, a law including a regulation for Open
Access imposed some obligations on research institutions and universities about
articles based on publicly funded research. Although its mandate allowed an un-
justifiably long embargo period (18 and 24 months from the publication date), it
remained - unsurprisingly - largely theoretical because it did not provide sanc-
tions for non-compliance and did not cope with the management of intellectual
property rights.64
On the other hand, the ANVUR, whose board members are appointed by the
Minister of Education65 and whose criteria are directly defined and enforced by
ministerial decrees, is currently in control of all the facets of Italian academic life.
It imposes automatic bibliometric criteria as ”objective measure“ for research eval-
uation, professorship qualification and even individual micro-grants to researchers
or pay raises. Bibliometric metadata used in the assessment exercise depends
either on proprietary, closed databases (Scopus, Clarivate Analytics) or on lists of
journals compiled by the ANVUR according to questionable criteria.66 Moreover,
the raw bibliometric data on which ANVUR evaluations and rankings are based
are neither open nor accessible.67
Thus, while the urge to reconsider the use of journal-based metrics to as-
sess research is gaining somehow momentum,68 assessment in Italy has taken the
shape of a centralized administrative evaluation dependent on closed bibliometric
data and ministerial decrees. In Italy, bibliometric evaluation,69 is not a decen-
tralized choice made by some university administrators and somehow shared by
researchers: it is an obligation enforced by a government agency that can only
be challenged by costly and time-consuming appeals to the administrative courts.
Hence, it is easy to understand why moving from words to deeds is so difficult
in Italy, whatever meaning we may attribute to ”open science“. A non-negotiable
bibliometric research evaluation needs bibliometric data, and the easiest - even
if not the smartest and the cheapest - way to find them is relying on proprietary
databases like Scopus and Clarivate Analytics and on the journals indexed in
64Valentina Moscon. Open Access to Scientific Articles: Comparing Italian with German law. 2013.
url: http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2013/12/03/open-access-to-scientific-articles-
comparing-italian-with-german-law/.
65The ANVUR board candidates are selected by a committee whose members are appointed by the
OECD secretary general, by the president of the Accademia dei Lincei, by the Consiglio Nazionale
degli Studenti Universitari, by the Minister of Education and by the president of the European Research
Council (https://anvur.miur.it/): the final choice about the appointments to the board is up to the
Minister of Education. Among the listed institutions, only the Consiglio Nazionale degli Studenti is
based on a selection by vote, since it is elected by the Italian students. Comparatively, even the current
semi-representative government of Hong Kong is more democratic than the Anvur.
66Massimo Mazzotti. “Listing wildly”. In: Times Higher Education (2012). url: https://www.
timeshighereducation.com/features/listing-wildly/421723.article?storycode=421723.
67Alberto Baccini and Giuseppe De Nicolao. “How Pseudoscientific Rankings Are Distorting Re-
search”. In: Institute for New Economic Thinking (2018). url: https://www.ineteconomics.org/
perspectives/blog/how-pseudoscientific-rankings-are-distorting-research.
68See for example the San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment (https://sfdora.org/
read/) among whose signers are currently included, for instance, the universities of Oxford and Cam-
bridge.
69In the fields of human and social sciences, the Anvur claims not to use bibliometric, but a home-
made list of administratively approved journals (Mazzotti, op. cit.) whose ranking is rather similar to the
system that Australia adopted - and dropped - some years ago (Sunanda Creagh. “Journal Rankings
Ditched: The Experts Respond”. en. In: The Conversation [2011]). However, calling such a system
”not bibliometric“ is hardly accurate, as the academic career of Italian SSH scholars depends on the
amount of articles published in journals included in the Anvur lists.
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them. Such a choice, obviously, does not help to solve the serial crisis.70
The backwardness of research assessment in Italy - centralized, controlled by
the government, enchained to rigid quantitative parameters - is an extreme instance
of the administrative authoritarianism71 that is stiffening, globally, an activity for
whose freedom the natural philosophers of the early modern age had to fight. Its
bureaucratic over-organization under the twin powers of Big Business and Big
Government72 can help us to understand that asking why open science needs to
be mandated is not enough: we should ask, more radically, if open science can
really be mandated.
A critical appraisal of A. Bonaccorsi’s attempt to justify the State assessment
of research in Italy might help us to answer such a question. Bonaccorsi is, as
it were, a Zimanian more than a Mertonian scholar:73 while his research field is
business economics, he served and is serving as an official in a few governmental
and inter-governmental organizations. As a former board member of the ANVUR,
he wrote a book, La valutazione possibile,74 whose major goal was showing that the
Italian State research assessment was not only scientific, but scientifically sound
as well. An abridged English version of his argument can be read in the preface
of a collection of essays edited by him and published by a powerful commercial
publisher, mostly under a paywall, in spite of being funded by public money.75
It is not just about Italy: if even the Italian State research evaluation - central-
ized, bureaucratic, authoritarian - were convincingly conceivable as scientific, open
science could be mandated and, yet, remain science.
5.1 The scale and the sword: peer evaluation and State assess-
ment of research
At the end of the day, the legitimation of research evaluation will be achieved
when people will recognize that it is an integral part of the academic profes-
sion. We evaluate and we are evaluated. We see and we are seen, all the time.
And since working in the academy is perhaps the most rewarding profession
70In 2012 the Harvard University total operating expenses amounted to about three billions of euros,
while, in the same years, the funding of the whole Italian university system was only 6,83 billions. In
the same year, however, Harvard was able to warn that its library could not afford journal publishers’
price and to encourage its faculty members to prefer open access journals (Ian Sample. “Harvard
University says it can’t afford journal publishers’ prices”. In: The Guardian [2012]. url: https:
//www.theguardian.com/science/2012/apr/24/harvard-university-journal-publishers-prices).
71Ron Srigley. “Whose University Is It Anyway?” In: Los Angeles Review of Books (2018). url:
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/whose-university-is-it-anyway/.
72Aldous Huxley. Brave new world revisited. 1958. url: http://www.huxley.net/bnw-revisited/,
p. III.
73As Roberto Caso remarked, writing papers to vindicate the activity of the agency we serve can
hardly be seen as an example of Mertonian disinterestedness (Roberto Caso. Una valutazione (della
ricerca) dal volto umano: la missione impossibile di Andrea Bonaccorsi. 2017. doi: 10.5281/zenodo.
375968. url: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.375968, §6).
74Andrea Bonaccorsi. La valutazione possibile. Teoria e pratica nel mondo della ricerca. Bologna.
Il Mulino, 2015. I wrote a detailed critical review about it in Maria Chiara Pievatolo. “La bilancia e
la spada: scienza di stato e valutazione della ricerca”. In: Bollettino telematico di filosofia politica
(2017). url: https://commentbfp.sp.unipi.it/maria-chiara-pievatolo-la-bilancia-e-la-spada-
scienza-di-stato-e-valutazione-della-ricerca/.
75Andrea Bonaccorsi, ed. The Evaluation of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities: Lessons
from the Italian Experience. Cham: Springer, 2018, p. xvii. Some of the trickiest arguments of the
Italian version are absent from the English one: for instance, a misquotation of Stephen Cole. Making
Science : Between Nature and Society. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard U.P., 1992, p. 175 has been
luckily removed (Pievatolo, op. cit., (8.2)).
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in the world, one might also expect that evaluating oneself and the others is
a source of professional satisfaction, while being evaluated (yes, sometimes
negatively) is part of life.76
Italian professors, apparently, have still to learn to be evaluated. How is
it possible, after millennia of academic controversies, that, in the motherland of
Galilei and Fermi, of Giordano Bruno, Aquinas and Benedetto Croce, scholars need
to be taught such a basic fact of academic life by a board of functionaries appointed
by the government? If evaluation meant the ”peer evaluation“ wonderfully painted
in Raffaello’s Scuola d’Atene, Bonaccorsi’s remark would sound like a platitude.
It would not sound so, however, if evaluation were intended as an assessment
exercise established and directed by the government. The difference between
these two meanings can be illustrated by considering a well-known passage of
Kant’s Perpetual Peace:
The jurist, who has taken as his symbol the scales of right and the sword of
justice, usually uses the latter, not merely to keep any extraneous influence
away from the former, but will throw the sword into one of the scales if it
refuses to sink (vae victis!). Unless the jurist is at the same time a philosopher,
at any rate in moral matters, he is under the greatest temptation to do it, for
his business is merely to apply existing laws, and not to enquire whether they
are in need of improvement. He acts as this truly low rank of his faculty were
in fact one of the higher ones, for the simple reason that it is accompanied by
power (as is also the case with two of the other faculties).77
Kant advocated freedom and free speech for philosophers, i.e. for pure or fun-
damental research,78 because of their ability to offer society independent, truth-
oriented point of views. The independence of philosophy, however, is not due to
some special feature of philosophers and their scholarship, but to their disconnec-
tion from the government and its power. Jurists seem to be powerful, but are just
functionaries at the service of the government: the very ministerial power conferred
to them makes them scholars of a lower rank, because they are always exposed to
the temptation of using their position to win any argument, throwing, metaphori-
cally, their sword on the scale like the Gaulish chieftain Brennus.79 Philosophers,
on the other hand, cannot end controversies in such a way because they have no
swords, but only questionable and questioned scales. Whereas jurists can hardly
be more than Zimanian scholars, philosophers have the opportunity to be Mer-
tonian scientists: the power of the former depends on their political appointment
to a ministerial function, while the authority of the latter is based only on their
ability to persuade their peers with their argumentation. Bonaccorsi, on the con-
trary, tries to trivialize the difference between assessing research by the sword,
as a functionary appointed by the government, and evaluating it by the scale, as
a scientist among scientists.
Research evaluation is an activity that has two, not just one, sources of le-
gitimation. On the one hand, the parliament and the government in many
76Bonaccorsi, op. cit., p. XVI.
77I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, Ak VIII,369, transl. in Immanuel Kant. Political Writings. Ed. by
Hans Reiss. Trans. by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
78The faculty of philosophy, in Kant’s Der Streit der Facultäten (Ak VII, 28), included history,
geography, philology and the humanities, natural sciences, mathematics and philosophy proper.
79Livy, Ab urbe condita, V.48.9.
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countries have created dedicated structures to carry out research evaluation
and actively make use of their results. This is a legal and institutional form
of legitimation. It comes from the legitimate democratic authority of modern
states. On the other hand, however, scientific and academic communities create
and manage a different source of legitimation, based on scientific recognition
and expertise.80
According to him, these ”two sources of legitimation“ are not in opposition to
each other, but concur in justifying his assessment activity at the service of the
Italian government. After all, who would dare to put into question the "legitimate
democratic authority of modern states”?81 The point, however, is not whether the
hand wielding the sword of political power is legal, but whether such a sword
may interfere with the measurement given by the scale without adulterating it.
Even if we discovered that Brennus was a democratically elected leader of the
Senones, the difference between weighing gold by the sword and weighing it by
the scale would remain unchanged. Reaching an agreement on the proper way
of weighing gold through experimentation and conversation is not the same as
unsheathing the sword to get the last word. Hence, stating that "it is mandatory
for those involved in research evaluation to open a never-ending dialogue with the
scientific communities, in order to gain legitimation from a bottom-up and trust-
based process, not only from the (inevitably top down) institutional procedures“82
is not enough: if State assessment of research requires ”inevitably top down
institutional procedures“, the last say is left to the sword, however long the alleged
”dialogue“ may be. In Italy, Caesar est supra grammaticos.
5.2 A sociological theory of science
Bonaccorsi’s planned ”never-ending dialogue with the scientific communities“ is
mainly addressed to human and social scientists, with the purpose of ”building up
an argument about the scientific nature of SSH, based on a thorough recognition
of the way in which they build up valid knowledge“.83 Social and human scientists,
in other words, need to be persuaded that the Italian State assessment of research
can portray their work as it would be evaluated by themselves, or, metaphorically,
that the ministerial sword thrown on the scale exerts no influence on the result of
the weighing. However, if Bonaccorsi argumentative endeavor were successful, it
would make the whole State assessment of research useless: why bothering to drop
an expensive administrative sword on the scholarly scale if the result remains the
same? Perhaps, his very attempt to minimize the weight of the sword betrays that
Italy’s heavy political interference in activities that should be constitutionally free
both in their practice and in their teaching is indeed a rather worrying question.
As regards science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), Bonac-
corsi seems to believe that journals and citations are more than proxies whose
80Bonaccorsi, op. cit., p. V, emphasis added.
81Indeed, some democratic states, including Italy, give scientific research a constitutional protection.
About the article 33 (”The arts and sciences as well as their teaching are free”) of the Italian Consti-
tution, inspired by the experience of fascist cultural subjection, see for example Amedeo Santosuosso,
Valentina Sellaroli, and Elisabetta Fabio. “What constitutional protection for freedom of scientific
research?” In: Journal of medical ethics 33.6 (2007), pp. 342–344. doi: 10.1136/jme.2007.020594.
url: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2598288.
82Bonaccorsi, op. cit., pp. V–VI.
83Ibid., p. V.
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function depends on the legacy of printing technological and economical bottle-
necks: core journals and citations build a qualitative yet measurable hierarchy
that mirrors the ”hierarchical system“ of science, ”based on a cumulative process
of reputation building“.84. As regards social sciences and the humanities (SSH),
an ”epistemic approach“ can yield a ”thorough recognition of the way in which
they build up valid knowledge“85. Robert K. Merton would have treated such an
approach as a ”sociological theory of knowledge“, aimed at identifying the social
foundations of valid knowledge,86 and would have refrained from such an ”adven-
ture in polymathy“.87
In fact, a sociological theory of knowledge is prone to the danger of being
just a more sophisticated and convoluted way to state "ipse dixit". For either
the ministerial evaluator is able to recognize, internally, each of the scientific
ways in which every single discipline builds up valid knowledge, or he can just
take, externally, a picture of the social mores through which scientific communities
establish the validity of a claim. If the former were true, the appointment by the
government would magically transform the ministerial evaluator in a polymath, who
could assess research without bibliometric proxies because he would be familiar
with every disciplinary method. But if the latter is more plausible, the evaluation
of research is led to depend on a huge, fallacious argumentum ab auctoritate,
stemming from a confusion between good science and socially successful research,
or between the validity of a theory and its impact.88
In STEM, according to Bonaccorsi, valid science is the highly cited science
published in a list of top-journals; in SSH the situation is more complicated
and requires more studies to get the longed-for rankings, with the help of expert
reviewers. appointed by a hierarchy of nominated officials whose top is, as usual,
the Anvur board.
ANVUR’s assessment system has raised many criticisms: for instance, its very
dependence on stiff, centralized administrative rules and parameters exposes it
to the effects of the Goodhart’s law, a kind of uncertainty principle applied to
social sciences. Italian researchers seem to have learned to game the system.89
Here, however, the alleged ”never-ending dialogue with the scientific communities“
84Ibid., pp. 3–4.
85Ibid., pp. VIII, 7.
86Robert K. Merton. Znaniecki’s "The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge". 1941, pp. 41–42.
87"Science is a deceptively inclusive word which refers to a variety of distinct though interrelated
items. It is commonly used to denote ( 1) a set of characteristic methods by means of which knowledge
is certified; (2) a stock of accumulated knowledge stemming from the application of these methods; ( 3)
a set of cultural values and mores governing the activities termed scientific ; or ( 4) any combination of
the foregoing. We are here concerned in a preliminary fashion with the cultural structure of science,
that is, with one limited aspect of science as an institution. Thus, we shall consider, not the methods
of science, but the mores with which they are hedged about. To be sure, methodological canons are
often both technical expedients and moral compulsives, but it is solely the latter which is our concern
here. This is an essay in the sociology of science, not an excursion in methodology. Similarly, we shall
not deal with the substantive findings of sciences (hypotheses, uniformities, laws), except as these are
pertinent to standardized social sentiments toward science. This is not an adventure in polymathy.”
Robert K. Merton. The Normative Structure of Science. 1942. url: https://www.collier.sts.vt.
edu/5424/pdfs/merton_1973.pdf, p. 268, emphasis mine.
88On that subject, Alessandro Figà-Talamanca. “The "impact factor" in the evaluation of research”.
In: Bulletin du Groupement international pour la recherche scientifique en stomatologie & odontologie
44.1 (2002). url: http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/bullgirso/article/view/5926 is still worth
reading.
89Baccini, Nicolao, and Petrovich, op. cit. documented the effects of Goodhart’s law in Italy: but they
are hardly an Italian peculiarity (Fire and Guestrin, op. cit.).
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comes to a dead end. When asked about the failures90 of their centralized and
enforced quantitative performance rating of research, their answer is always the
same: even if they were true, they would be irrelevant, because it are based just
on anecdotal evidences.91 Providing more and more evidences and citing more
and more literature92 to show that the failures of quantitative assessment systems
are not irrelevant would trap us in the sorites paradox.93 How many instances of
failure would State evaluators require to admit that the quantitative system they
are enforcing corrupts research instead of improving it? Always one more. And,
since they can and do end the conversation by throwing their ministerial sword
on the scale, keeping on discussing about it would be just a Sysiphean endeavor.
Hence, to avoid the paradox and reach a conclusion, we have to try another way,
which does not rely on a data analysis always exposed to the danger of being
supplemented by more or less comfortable ad hoc hypothesis.
5.3 State evaluation of research: the - administrative - pool of
Narcissus
For the sake of argument, let us assume the Italian State assessment of research
could mirror it in a perfectly faithful way: that, in other words, the Italian State
assessment of research really portrayed the work of Italian scholars as it would
be evaluated by themselves if they were still free to do it. In such a counter-
factual condition, Caesar would be still ”supra grammaticos“, but his evaluations
would magically be identical to the judgments made by the Italian scientific com-
munity. Let us assume, moreover, that gaming and fraud were not just, as alleged,
90The system can fail both ”upwards“, when it is not able to recognize the merit of very brilliant
and innovative researchers (Colleen Flaherty. “The Costs of Publish or Perish”. In: Inside Higher
Education [2015]. url: https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/10/12/study- suggests-
pressure - publish - impedes - innovation), and ”downwards“, when it provides perverse incentives,
encouraging manipulation and fraud (Paul E. Smaldino and Richard McElreath. “The natural selection
of bad science”. In: Royal Society Open Science (2012). doi: 10.1098/rsos.160384, Mark A. Edwards
and Siddharta Roy. “Academic Research in the 21st Century: Maintaining Scientific Integrity in a
Climate of Perverse Incentives and Hypercompetition”. In: Environmental engineering science (2016).
doi: 10.1089/ees.2016.0223. url: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5206685/).
91See “Towards an Epistemic Approach to Evaluation in SSH”. in: The Evaluation of Research in
Social Sciences and Humanities: Lessons from the Italian Experience. Ed. by Andrea Bonaccorsi.
Cham: Springer, 2018, p. 5 ("I find most arguments about the possibility of manipulation of bibliometric
information, such as the Impact factor, rather pointless. Science itself is manipulable. There are
many examples of fake discoveries or misbehaviour of scientists. The truly interesting question is not
why these things happen, but why they happen so infrequently and how it happens that they are
almost invariably discovered and punished’) and Redazione Roars. “Bibliometric evaluation chokes
innovation. But it’s OK because “We are not all Galilei and Newton””. In: ROARS (2019). url:
https : / / www . roars . it / online / bibliometric - evaluation - chokes - innovation - but - its - ok -
because-we-are-not-all-galilei-and-newton/
92See, just for instance, the extemporaneous list offered by Giuseppe De Nicolao here.
93William M. Briggs. The Sorites Paradox Isn’t. 2011. url: https://wmbriggs.com/post/3578:
the poison of the paradox is the confusion between quality and quantity. From a qualitative point
of view, scientific theories are not fungible objects, but mutually irreplaceable unique pieces: hence,
the Wakefield affair and its consequences cannot be dismissed as ”anecdotal“ even if his article about
an alleged link between MMR vaccine and autism were the only accident of the high Impact Factor
journal that published it (Julia Belluz. 20 Years Ago, Research Fraud Catalyzed the Anti-Vaccination
Movement. Let’s Not Repeat History. 2018. url: https://www.vox.com/2018/2/27/17057990/andrew-
wakefield- vaccines- autism- study). On the other hand, from the quantitative point of view of an
auditing system, the target is not the unfathomable quality of every single paper, but its conformity
to a prescribed, computable standard, regardless of its contents (Biagioli, “Quality to Impact, Text to
Metadata: Publication and Evaluation in the Age of Metrics”, 266 ff.).
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anecdotal, but nonexistent, and that the evaluators appointed by government were
perfectly fair and, therefore, they were able to depict a faithful portrait of science
done right. All these theoretical points are conceded to make clear that the ques-
tion is not whether the Italian State assessment research is accurate, or useful,
but whether is right - whether, in other words, a fanciful perfect Caesar would be
entitled to be supra grammaticos.
In his essay on the Enlightenment, 94 Kant takes into consideration the case
of a society of clergymen, democratically or aristocratically ruled, which, after a
long discussion, commits itself freely to a certain unalterable doctrine of faith. Is
it entitled to do so? According to Kant, a perpetual commitment would be "a crime
against human nature" and would "prevent all further enlightenment of mankind
forever". If a church assembly took - even democratically - such a decision, it would
contradictorily deprive the next generations of that same right to deliberate and to
apply their own understanding of which it had made use in defining the dogma. A
system of beliefs - or even an ethos - whose justification depends on its partakers’
free choice cannot be codified in a coercive norm without cutting the root of its
very legitimacy. If its established doctrine deserves to be accepted because it has
been freely discussed and chosen by a community, it should be possible to keep
on debating and choosing it not only yesterday or the day before yesterday, but
also today and tomorrow.
Kant, who lived under an absolute monarchy, remarked that in general, "to test
whether any particular measure can be agreed upon as a law for a people, we
need only ask whether a people could well impose such a law upon itself" (AK VIII
39).
Something which a people may not even impose upon itself can still less
be imposed on it by a monarch; for his legislative authority depends precisely
up his uniting the collective will of the people in own (AK VIII 39-40).
Such an argument can easily be extended from politics to science. Since
science - or, at least, modern science - does not rely on the authority principle
but on the freedom of an unended quest, no collective choice, however democratic,
may stop its discussion: the next generation of researchers may continue the
quest only if they retain the same liberty that was bestowed to their predecessors.
Something which a scientific community cannot impose upon itself can still less be
imposed on it by an administrative authority. Even if the State research assessment
issued a perfectly faithful picture of the collective self-evaluation of scientists, its
mirror would have the paralyzing effect of the pool of Narcissus: Ptolemy would
consistently suppress Copernicus - science past would systematically suffocate
science future. In more prosaic words, when the sword of a political evaluation,
however democratic, steps in the processes of research, science cannot be compared
to an open, competitive market95 any longer.
The criticism of Kant against political interference in all the intellectual en-
deavors requiring an autonomous reason and a sincere faith is normative, not
empirical. Kant does not look - à la Foucault - for some soft power hidden in the
fabric of society. Even if the administrative sword were as light as a feather, its
power - the power to suppress the future and possible for the sake of the past
94Ak VIII 39-40, transl. in Kant, op. cit., p. 57.
95"The kind of competition experienced in science is similar to the situation of competitive markets, in
which entry is open, incumbents never get a monopoly position, and it is not possible for an incumbent
to manipulate strategic variables to its own advantage" (Bonaccorsi, loc. cit.).
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and the established - would be hard, and in plain sight:96 research cannot be
constrained by some irrevocable past decision, without ceasing to be science, just
like faith cannot be constrained according some irrevocable dogma without ceasing
to be faith and becoming bureaucratic despotism.
6 Conclusion: open access and open mind
Open access advocates have to deal with a plenty of administrative and legal ques-
tions, because the very open access movements have had to work in an environment
stiffened by a pervasive copyright law and a bureaucratic research assessment. Be-
ing overwhelmed by the challenge of the day and saluting the administrative open
access and FAIR data mandates enforced by governments and research funders as
the final goal of their endeavors is understandable, yet dangerous. For a mandated
but enclosed openness of text and data, within an authoritarian research system
stifling open science and open minds exposes us to a risk of which a computer
scientist and philosopher like Joseph Weizenbaum, whose Jew family had left Nazi
Germany in 1936, was already aware more than forty years ago:
In 1935, Michael Polanyi, then holder of the Chair of Physical Chemistry
at the Victoria University of Manchester, England, was suddenly shocked into
a confrontation with philosophical questions that have ever since dominated
his life. The shock was administered by Nicolai Bukharin, one of the leading
theoreticians of the Russian Communist party, who told Polanyi that "under
socialism the conception of science pursued for its own sake would disappear,
for the interests of scientists would spontaneously turn to the problems of
the current Five Year Plan." Polanyi sensed then that "the scientific outlook
appeared to have produced a mechanical conception of man and history in
which there was no place for science itself." And further that "this conception
denied altogether any intrinsic power to thought and thus denied any grounds
for claiming freedom of thought."97
Meanwhile, the former Soviet Union, with its ambition to deal with the future
by planning it, has come to an end.98 Yet, whoever does not let himself be over-
whelmed by the demands of the day can - and should - ask whether the openness
worth pursuing is just about texts and data, and not also, and above all, about
minds.
96Unsurprisingly, State assessment of research in Italy has been criticized by legal scholars, accus-
tomed to cope with the unconstitutional face of power which a Foucauldian approach may leave hidden
in plain sight: see Caso, loc. cit. and Roberto Caso. “Perché l’ANVUR è ancora in vita?” In: Bollettino
telematico di filosofia politica (2017). url: https://btfp.sp.unipi.it/it/2017/06/anvurcaso/.
Perhaps the reason of such a neglect is already concealed in a 1971 conversation, openly accessi-
ble in “Chomsky-Foucault : « Justice Contre Pouvoir »”. In: Le Monde Diplomatique (2007). url:
https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2007/08/A/15053, between Foucault and Noam Chomsky: if
every struggle is about power and none about justice, there is no way to distinguish the scale from
the sword, or soft power from hard power, even when the latter is violating constitutional rights. Inter-
estingly, Bonaccorsi loves to cope with criticisms derived from the current Foucauldian scholasticism
(Bonaccorsi, op. cit., 20 ff.).
97Weizenbaum, op. cit., p. 1, emphasis mine.
98According to Porter, op. cit., p. 43, its mechanism, however, is still thriving in the West: "Zinoviev’s
remark about Soviet economic plans applies with few changes to bureaucratic business corporations
in the West: quantification is simultaneously a means of planning and of prediction"
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